With this book the authors state clearly that dealing ethically with elderly people in healthcare is not possible without the caregiversÕ moral sensitivity and critical self evaluation, especially with regard to the everyday practice of care. To realize, for example, that the daily washing of an elderly person is a delicate and intimate event, can contribute to better attention to personal integrity, for instance by taking care of the personÕs privacy.
The personal dignity and integrity of the elderly according to the authors are at stake. While institutional health care in Belgium and The Netherlands is confronted with an increasingly elderly population and is forced more and more to apply efficiency-based models of organisational care to lower costs, the caregiversÕ perspective of (giving) care seems to be alienated from these models. So much so that caregivers have reached a point where they do not recognize their original motivation to care for ÔtheirÕ patients; the dignity of the caregiver is therefore at stake too. The basic sense of taking care of another person should be recovered as an essential need for both the elderly person and caregiver, in order to prevent further decrease of the quality of care. Therefore reflection on fundamentally relational values of elderly care is necessary.
The authors want to meet the needs of caregivers who ask for guidance in this process of ethical questioning in order to make the right moral decisions.
The second chapter discusses hygienic care and generally-spatial limitations of elderly people. The next part deals with the ethical issues of restraint in elderly care. Thorough reflection and attention for these issues give way to creative solutions and individual adjusted personal care, when the patientÕs recognition of his personal identity is taken into account.
The importance of Ôhaving a mealÕ instead of serving food is stressed in chapter 4. It sets an example for different sorts of daily activities, which can be supportive in terms of improving selfsufficiency and patientsÕ self-respect. If attended to in a proper way, these activities can create meaningfulness for those who take part in it.
The following chapters (4-8) of the book discuss several main ethical issues in elderly care: artificial feeding; withdrawing medical treatment for terminally ill elderly people; euthanasia and suicide. Each part offers practical references to facilitate the process of decision-making in the complexity of these matters. In their conclusions the authors repeatedly reflect on the potential role of (Christian) religion as a profound dimension that can enrich this process for the elderly patient as well as for the caregiver.
Although the title mentions ÔcirclesÕ of care, the book criticizes less the levels of influence than one might have expected. Responsibility for wellorganised and humanity based care weighs heavily for the caregiversÕ level of institutional care, as it should. ÔCirclesÕ on a policy -and political level however should be drawn into this field of ethically responsible actors as well. The authors could have made a stronger statement at this point.
The book surprises with its construction on the ethical basis of daily care in the first parts and the postponement of the Ôbig ethical issuesÕ to the last. Therefore it links up to the experiences of caregivers at various levels of care practice who are not comfortable with the quality of the (humanity based) care they can provide. ment of dreadful diseases. Although steady improvements can be observed, multiple problems remain -not only technical but also normative ones. Thomas HeinemannÕs book engages in this debate and provides a comprehensive overview of techniques and ethical arguments concerning cloning.
After a first, introductory chapter, the author explains essential scientific terms, techniques, and theories. Here, basics of embryology and cell biology -including the concept of stem cellsand cloning procedures are explained. The chapter also investigates the scientific and medical motivation and objectives of stem cell research and cloning and assesses the techniques according to the criteria of suitability and necessity.
The third chapter offers a comparative analysis of the legal and ethical debate about cloningfor-research in Germany, Great Britain, France, and the United States. Whereas there is relative consensus concerning the justification of research with somatic stem cells, cells derived from umbilical cord blood, EC-cells, and EG-cells, research with ES-cells is deeply controversial. For each of the four countries, the book illustrates the debate of the last decades and analyses the arguments that are used pro or contra cloning-for-research.
Chapter 4 is an analysis parallel to chapter 3, now concentrating on reproductive cloning. The arguments against reproductive cloning that the author extracts from the national documents of Germany, the UK, France, and the US clearly outweigh those in favour of it.
Chapter 5 finally summarizes and evaluates the different arguments that are used in the four countries. The British position of concentrating on the singularity after the fourteenth day after conception is criticized as not very plausible (p. 573); the ethical discourse in the US is criticized for being too obeying to common-morality (p. 574); the French position of combining internal factors (human dignity) with external ones (Ôprojet parentalÕ) is criticized for not explaining the relative relevance of each of these factors (p. 575); the German position of protecting the embryo due to the concept of human dignity is criticized because it refers to a biological point in time that is not self-evident (p. 575). However, the author considers the German position as the most plausible and reasonable one, arguing with the precautionary principle (pp. 577 ff.).
Altogether, this volume provides a comprehensive database for tracing the discourse on cloning with its various, sometimes countryspecific arguments, even if one does not come to the authorÕs evaluative conclusions.
Ju¨rgen Wallner
Wien, Austria show how human beings are part of both the physical and mental sphere, both living material organisms and moral beings (he calls this position ''synthetic anthropology'', and distinguishes it from reductionist explanations preferring either of both spheres). The first part of the book presents an instructive and competent discussion of the history of evolutionary thought from pre-Darwin times up to modern sociobiology and evolutionary psychology, but with a robust distance to the last. The second part (from chapter 5 on) further elaborates the authorÕs own thoughts. Here Illies develops a rather far-reaching thesis about ''morality in a philosophical sense'' (i.e. morality which is based on reason, cf. p. 166 sqq. The entire book shows a Kantian bent -which certainly is no disadvantage). On the one hand, morality can neither be founded upon nor be sufficiently explained by biology or evolutionary theory (as it profoundly depends upon reasonable beings willing to stick to reasons in their actions), nor can it be rejected as an illusion by the biological sciences. But, on the other hand, nature provides the ''pre-history'' (214) and any possible ''frame'' (236) for morality, and morality itself can be an object of evolutionary considerations. Illies thus tries to show how, within this framework and with the help of concrete ''evolutiona¨res Umsetzungswissen'', morality may be made to be ''evolutionary successful'' (285). The author -admirably, but quite optimistically -deems the hope for the durable evolutionary success of morality well-founded, citing such advantages of morality as e.g. inner consistency, trans-cultural compatibility and evolutionary stability. Here Illies tries to understand evolution with regard to morality in a certain way as teleological: the convergence of nature and morality is the aim for which humankind can long. The ideal of a humanity within which nature and morality converge (315), and even a ''moral culture'' (334), are entertained here. It shall not be reached by biotechnological means -these would only produce ''moral machines'' (p. 324) -but rather by human actions based on reason. This is a daring secular story of salvation impregnated by the rosy optimism of Kantian Enlightenment. But if Illies were right and evolution were leading this way, it would not be bad. So, even if the core thesis is not completely convincing, the book makes for a very inspiring read, rich in relevant arguments and illustrative examples.
Jan-Christoph Heilinger
Berlin, Germany '' (6) . In Attending Children, Mohrmann draws on 30 years of paediatric practice in (American) academic medical centres to develop her conception of the ''art of doctoring'' (6). With an admirable veracity, the author tells the story of her own professional and personal development from her tough first years of medical residency to the more serene part-time work in paediatric primary care later in her career (when she was also pursuing a doctorate in religious ethics). MohrmannÕs own story contains nineteen principle narratives -and, unsurprisingly, many more along the way -about the often grim fate of her young patients. These narratives are assembled to reveal what Mohrmann claims to be the three aspects of ÔattendingÕ children (and patients more generally): ''Ôto listen or pay attention toÕ, Ôto wait upon (as a servant), be present or accompanyÕ, and Ôto wait for or expectÕ'' (8). According to Mohrmann, ''all these facets of ÔattendingÕ are essential in order that accurate medical knowledge, that other sine qua non of good doctoring, be used appropriately and well on behalf of those who come to medicine for succour '' (15) . At the same time, she is remarkably critical of empathy, a concept akin to her notion of ÔattendingÕ, for its ''imperialistic proclivity'' and ''significant potential for misuse'' (156-7).
Attending Children makes for a touching and insightful read (in particular for those bioethics scholars who have never borne clinical responsibility). However, the bookÕs basic premises invite some questioning. Most would probably agree with Mohrmann that medicine is an art and not a science, yet her claim that ÔattendingÕ and accurate medical knowledge are sufficient conditions for the art of doctoring (15) is less convincing. The book is a powerful testimony that medical care should focus on the individual patient and his or her family -however, a concept of good doctoring must also account for decision-making under reasonable resource constraints; for defensible ways of contributing to medical knowledge in research; for acceptable approaches to making organs available for transplantation; and so forth. It seems that MohrmannÕs two conditions of good doctoring -explicitly formulated as being necessary and sufficient -will not do to address many of the most pressing ethical questions in todayÕs clinical practice.
One also wonders whether MohrmannÕs idea of good doctoring is not a (particular) idea of good living. Listening, accompanying and waiting seem important for almost any relationship, most importantly for personal relationships. Apparently, some of MohrmannÕs colleagues label her approach to clinical practice as a form of ''overinvolvement'' (144) . This seems to indicate that not everyone in clinical practice would be willing to principally narrate his or her identity as being a physician (as Mohrmann does in her book). It is doubtful that MohrmannÕs encompassing normative concept of good doctoring is easily generalizable.
Finally, internal inconsistencies such as the parallel emphasis on ''accurate medical knowledge'' (15) and on allowing for ''perplexing marvels' ' (129) or ''moments of transcendence in an inexplicable healing' ' (124) One upshot of the survey is that the interviewees refuse a strict binding character of advance directives, and wish that physicians should make medical decisions together with relatives in case the patient is incapable of making decisions on her own. Relatives are still seen as ''natural proxies'' of patients. Sahm draws the conclusion that proxies should occupy a central position in medical decision-making and thus should be combined with advance directives. Such a combination is, according to Sahm, useful for chronic disease, and could amount to an advanced care planning. Being diagnosed with a disease makes it easier to think about treatment preferences and end-of-lifeoptions since SahmÕs empirical survey demonstrates that people change their mind (preferences and wishes regarding medical treatment) when they fall ill. Hence, an advance care planning is much more drawn from life than an advance directive set up by a healthy person, as Sahm concludes.
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